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09/658,239	09/08/2000	Loren G. Knutson	068520.0103	3004

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Baker Botts LLP  
2001 Ross Avenue  
Dallas, TX 75201-2980

EXAMINER
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SHRADER, LAWRENCE J

ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
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2124

DATE MAILED: 10/08/2003

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

# Office Action Summary

Application No.

09/658,239

Applicant(s)

KNUTSON ET AL.

Examiner

Lawrence Shrader

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-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

## Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If the period for reply specified above is less than thirty (30) days, a reply within the statutory minimum of thirty (30) days will be considered timely.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133).
- Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

## Status

- 1) ☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on 5/1/08; 7/15/03.
- 2a) ☐ This action is **FINAL**. 2b) ☒ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

## Disposition of Claims

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 1-20 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 1-20 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

## Application Papers

- 9) ☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☐ The drawing(s) filed on \_\_\_\_\_ is/are: a) ☐ accepted or b) ☐ objected to by the Examiner.
- Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).
- 11) ☐ The proposed drawing correction filed on \_\_\_\_\_ is: a) ☐ approved b) ☐ disapproved by the Examiner.
- If approved, corrected drawings are required in reply to this Office action.
- 12) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner.

## Priority under 35 U.S.C. §§ 119 and 120

- 13) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☐ All b) ☐ Some \* c) ☐ None of:
1. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
2. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. \_\_\_\_\_.
3. ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).
- \* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.
- 14) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for domestic priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(e) (to a provisional application).
- a) ☐ The translation of the foreign language provisional application has been received.
- 15) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for domestic priority under 35 U.S.C. §§ 120 and/or 121.

## Attachment(s)

- 1) ☒ Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)
- 2) ☐ Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)
- 3) ☒ Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449) Paper No(s) 6, 8.
- 4) ☐ Interview Summary (PTO-413) Paper No(s). \_\_\_\_\_.
- 5) ☐ Notice of Informal Patent Application (PTO-152)
- 6) ☐ Other: \_\_\_\_\_.

### **DETAILED ACTION**

1. This action is in response to the amendment filed on July 15, 2003.
2. Receipt of the information disclosure statements on 5/01/03 and 7/15/03 is acknowledged, and they have been considered.

### ***Specification***

3. The specification objection made in the prior Office Action regarding the use of USPTO Form 1449 for the cited references is maintained because MPEP §609 III A1 requires that "U.S. applications must be identified by the inventor, the eight digit application number (the two digit series code and the six digit serial number), and the filing date." IDS paper #2 has not been considered because it lacks requirements of MPEP §609 III A1 regarding the inventor identification. The Examiner's initials indicated that the application listing was noted, but it was not considered.

The objection regarding the cross-references to other applications being placed apart from the specification is withdrawn.

### ***Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112***

4. The following is a quotation of the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

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The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.

5. The specification objection made in the prior office action are maintained for the following reasons:

The Applicant has argued:

"In the portion of the Office Action which bridges pages 2-3, the Examiner rejects Claims 1-20 under the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. §112, asserting that these claims are indefinite because they each include the word "different". In particular, the Examiner asserts that the word "different" is a relative term, and that it therefore renders Claims 1 and 11 indefinite. This §112 rejection is respectfully traversed, for the following reasons.

First, there is no good basis for the assertion that the word "different" is a "relative" term. In this regard, the provisions of MPEP §2173.05(b) discuss various terms which the PTO considers to be "relative" terms that could potentially be indefinite. The word "different" does not appear among the various terms which are discussed here. The Examiner has not offered any support whatsoever for the assertion that "different" is a word which is routinely regarded by the PTO as a "relative" term.

The Examiner then goes on to assert: (1) that the word "different" is not defined in the claims, (2) that the specification does not provide a standard for ascertaining the requisite degree, and (3) that one of ordinary skill in the art would not reasonably understand the scope of the invention. The Examiner's statement on this point uses only standard "boilerplate" language, and does not contain a single word which is specific to the context of the claims that appear in the present application. In fact, the entire §112 rejection lacks a single word of explanation as to why, in the specific context of Claims 1 and 11, the word "different" might somehow present some indefiniteness. The Examiner basically assumes that the word "different" is automatically indefinite whenever it is used in a claim, but that assumption is contrary to standard PTO practice.

Further, it should be noted that Claims 8-9 and 18-19 of the present application each use the word "different", and the Examiner has not raised any objection to the word "different" in these claims. Consequently, it is respectfully submitted that the Examiner recognizes that the word "different" is not inherently indefinite. In order to establish that the word "different" is indefinite in Claims 1 and 11, even though it is not regarded as indefinite in Claims 8-9 and 18-19, the Examiner would need to discuss the specific context of the use of "different" in each of Claims 1 and 11, as mentioned above. However, the entire §112 rejection lacks even a single word of explanation which is specific to the context of Claims 1 and 11, and which explains why the word "different" should be considered indefinite in the specific context of Claims 1 and 11. It is therefore respectfully submitted that Examiner has failed to carry the burden of establishing that the word "different" is indefinite as used in the specific context of Claims 1 and 11. For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that there is no reasonable basis for the assertion that the word "different" is a relative

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term, and thus no basis for the assertion that Claims 1 and 11 are inherently indefinite because they include the word "different". It is therefore respectfully submitted that Claims 1-20 are definite and comply with the second paragraph of §112, and notice to that effect is respectfully requested."

Examiner's Response:

Firstly, MPEP §2173.05 (b) does not portray the various terms considered "relative" as an exhaustive list. MPEP 2173.05 (a) states that:

"The meaning of every term used in a claim should be apparent from the prior art or from the specification and drawings at the time the application is filed. Applicants need not confine themselves to the terminology used in the prior art, but are required to make clear and precise the terms that are used to define the invention whereby the metes and bounds of the claimed invention can be ascertained. During patent examination, the pending claims must be given the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification."

The term "different" as used in claims 1 and 11 is not precise because it leads one to ask a question: "different from what?" or "different in what manner, quality, or characteristic?" For example, the claims may refer to (1) function definitions that are different from other predetermined function definitions, or (2) various definition qualities or characteristics that are different among a plurality of predetermined function definitions in the same set, or (3) a separate set having predetermined function definitions that are different from another set of definitions. The context of the claim does not help resolve the questions.

With regard to the use of the word "different" in claims 8, 9, 18, and 19: a distinction between users is clear in claims 8 and 18 ("different users"); and a distinction between communications links is clear in claims 9 and 19 ("different communications links"); therefore, an objection was not raised for these claims. This precise clarity does not exist in claims 1 and 11 as demonstrated above.

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Nothing in the dependent claims fixed the problem in the independent parent claims, therefore all remaining dependent claims, 2 – 10 and 12 – 20, are rejected for the same reasons.

***Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102***

6. The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:

A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –

(e) the invention was described in (1) an application for patent, published under section 122(b), by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent or (2) a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent, except that an international application filed under the treaty defined in section 351(a) shall have the effects for purposes of this subsection of an application filed in the United States only if the international application designated the United States and was published under Article 21(2) of such treaty in the English language.

7. Claims 1 – 6, 8 – 10; 11 – 16, and 18 – 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(e) as being anticipated by Fowlow et al., U.S. Patent 6,083,277.

**In regard to claim 1:**

*“Providing a set of predetermined function definitions...”* Fowlow discloses a set of predetermined functions wherein component A is different from other components B, C, etc. (e.g., see Figure 3) because each component has distinct operations, arguments, attributes, etc. In light of the 35 USC § 112 rejection above, the term “different” is taken herein to mean that each component has distinct functional features.

*“Preparing a project definition...”* Fowlow discloses a means to prepare a distributed object application (project definition) by connecting distinct components (Abstract) having different function definitions (e.g., see Figure 3).

*“A plurality...”* Fowlow discloses a plurality of function portions comprised of components having methods performing specific predetermined functions, having an input port

and an output port (by which information is obtained and sent) related by the corresponding function definition (Abstract; column 2, lines 1 – 30; e.g., Figure 3). An interface defines a protocol of behavior (predetermined functions) with a set of constant and method definitions contained within an interface that can be implemented by any class anywhere in the class hierarchy. When a class implements an interface, the class agrees to implement all the methods (a function portion corresponding to a function definition) defined in the interface (see column 10, lines 35 – 43 wherein Fowlow discloses that “the interface of an object may specify the characteristics of that object; that is, how other objects may interact with it. By way of example, an interface may specify the operations defined upon that object, the arguments required for each operation and their respective types and the result and type that each operation returns).

*“A further portion...”* Fowlow discloses that the interface is retrieved to determine the both the destination portion (plugs) and the source portion (sockets), as well as the input and output ports through which the data is supplied and produced (Abstract; column 2, lines 1 – 60; e.g., Figure 3).

*“Binding information...”* Information is processed and an input is associated with a respective output wherein Fowlow discloses that the interface is retrieved to determine the both the destination portion (plugs) and the source portion (sockets), as well as the input and output ports through which the data is supplied and produced (Abstract; column 2, lines 1 – 60; e.g., Figures 4 and 5).

*“Transmitting through a communications link...”* Fowlow discloses connections links between components causing storing and execution of a definition (described in the interface of

the object component; Abstract, e.g., Figures 4 and 5). Also, Fowlow discloses that the system optionally may be coupled to a computer or telecommunications network using a network connection. With such a network connection, it is contemplated that the CPU might receive information from the network, or might output information to the network in the course of performing the above-described method steps (column 18, lines 47 – 55; e.g., Figure 10).

**In regard to claim 2**, incorporating the rejection of claim 1:

*“...wherein said preparing step is carried out at said first end of said communications links...”* Fowlow discloses that the system optionally may be coupled to a computer or telecommunications network using a network connection. With such a network connection, it is contemplated that the CPU might receive information from the network, or might output information to the network in the course of performing the above-described method steps (column 18, lines 47 – 55; e.g., Figure 10).

**In regard to claim 3**, incorporating the rejection of claim 1:

*“...including the step of configuring said communications link to include a network.”* Fowlow discloses that the system optionally may be coupled to a computer or telecommunications network using a network connection. With such a network connection, it is contemplated that the CPU might receive information from the network, or might output information to the network in the course of performing the above-described method steps (column 18, lines 47 – 55; e.g., Figure 10).

**In regard to claim 4**, incorporating the rejection of claim 3:

*“...to include a portion of the Internet.”* Fowlow discloses protocols allowing the network to include the Internet (column 5, lines 26 – 36).



**In regard to claim 5**, incorporating the rejection of claim 1:

*“...said first and second ends of said communications link to be physically remote locations.”* Fowlow discloses a system directed towards a distributed system, including CORBA (column 3, lines 50 – 64). CORBA specifies a system, which provides interoperability between objects in a heterogeneous, distributed environment.

**In regard to claim 6**, incorporating the rejection of claim 1:

*“...and including the step of subsequently executing said project definition in response to receipt of a further communication through a communications link.”* Fowlow discloses that an Object Request Broker provides transport mechanisms in a distributed system to deliver a communication from a client to a servant object, and invokes an operation on a distributed object (column 3, line 65 to column 4, line 18).

**In regard to claim 8**, incorporating the rejection of claim 6:

*“...said communication which initiates execution to be sent by respective different users.”* Fowlow discloses that an Object Request Broker provides transport mechanisms in a distributed system to deliver a communication from a client to a servant object, and invokes an operation on a distributed object (column 3, line 65 to column 4, line 18). A distributed system inherently contains different users.

**In regard to claim 9**, incorporating the rejection of claim 8:

*“...said communication which initiates execution to be sent by respective different communications links.”* Fowlow discloses that an Object Request Broker provides transport mechanisms in a distributed system to deliver a communication from a client to a servant object, and invokes an operation on a distributed object (column 3, line 65 to column 4, line 18). A

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distributed system inherently contains different users in different locations with inherently different communications links.

**In regard to claim 10**, incorporating the rejection of claim 6:

*“...said communication which initiates execution to be sent through the same communications link.”* Fowlow discloses that an Object Request Broker provides transport mechanisms in a distributed system to deliver a communication from a client to a servant object, and invokes an operation on a distributed object (column 3, line 65 to column 4, line 18). The Fowlow invention can run on the same machine or process or on different machines (column 4, lines 3 – 5), thus communication can be sent through the same communications link.

**In regard to claims 11 – 16, and 18 - 20** (a computer-readable medium), these claims are rejected for the same corresponding reasons put forth in the rejection of claims 1 – 6, and 8 - 10 (the method).

### ***Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103***

8. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103(a) which forms the basis for all

obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:

(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.

9. Claims 7 and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Fowlow et al., U.S. Patent 6,083,277 in view of Madany et al. U.S. Patent 6,493,870 (hereinafter referred to as Madany).

**In regard to claim 7**, incorporating the rejection of claim 6:

*“...configuring said communications link...and using a network browser to generate said further communication.”* Fowlow discloses a method of providing a set of distinct predetermined function definitions using a browser (column 10, line 63), but does not explicitly teach the use of a web browser. However, Madany discloses a distributed system with a remote execution method in which an execution package is created from a set of components in response to a communication through a communications link that may include the Internet (column 9, lines 27 – 28), the package is stored (in memory for execution) and executed (Abstract; column 5, lines 16 – 41; e.g., Figures 2 and 3). If the Internet is provided as a communications medium in the Madany invention, then one skilled in the art would expect the use of a web browser to generate communications between remote sites in the distributed system. Therefore, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art at the time the invention was made to combine the method of preparing the project definition of Fowlow with the Madany invention that stores and executes an application, which is constructed by packaging components, after receiving a communication over a communications link using a web browser over the Internet, because after preparing a project definition in the Fowlow invention it would be logical to execute it, and the Madany invention provides a means to accomplish the storage and execution in response a request over a communications link that includes the Internet.

**In regard to claim 17** (a computer-readable medium), this claim is rejected for the same corresponding reasons put forth in the rejection of claim 7 (the method).

***Response to Arguments***

10. Applicant's arguments filed July 15, 2003 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive:

**The Applicant has argued:**

(A) "The Office Action rejected Claims 1 and 11 under the judicially-created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting, based on either Claim 1 or Claim 4 of co-pending U.S. Serial No. 09/657,661, when taken in view of Dougherty U.S. Patent No. 6,370,575. This ground of rejection is respectfully traversed, for the following reasons.

First, and as recognized in the Office Action, the double patenting rejection is a provisional rejection, because it involves two applications which are both still pending. The attention of the Examiner is respectfully directed to the provisions of MPEP §804(1)(B), which relate to this type of situation, and which essentially state that, when one of the two applications reaches a point where the only remaining rejection is a provisional double patenting rejection, the Examiner should withdraw the provisional double patenting rejection in the first application, and maintain a nonprovisional double patenting rejection in the other application. Consequently, if the present application reaches a point where the provisional double patenting rejection is the only remaining objection, the Examiner should withdraw it.

Turning to the basis for the double patenting rejection, the Examiner notes that Claim 1 of the present application and Claim 1 of the '661 application have some similar limitations, but concedes that Claim 1 of the '661 application does not include a limitation comparable to the recitation in Applicants' Claim 1 of "transmitting through a communications link from a first end thereof to a second end thereof a communication from a user which causes one of storing and execution of the project definition at said second end of the communications link". The Examiner asserts that, when Claim 1 of the '661 application is considered in view of the Dougherty patent, the subject matter of this limitation would be obvious.

In this regard, the Examiner asserts that Dougherty teaches the deployment and execution of a project definition file over a communications link (in the abstract and at lines 13-19 of Column 10). Applicants respectfully disagree. The abstract of Dougherty says nothing at all about a project definition file, much less deployment or execution thereof. Lines 13-19 of Column 10 mention a project definition file, but merely state that, for each new project within an organization, a project definition file is created. There is nothing in these portions of Dougherty to support the Examiner's assertion that Dougherty teaches a project definition file which is transmitted or deployed through a communications link. At best, Dougherty appears to teach that a communication sent through a communications link causes a new project definition tile to be created. This is different from what is recited in Applicants' Claim 1.

In particular, Applicants' Claim 1 requires that a project definition exist before a specified communication is sent through a communications link,

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and specifies that the communication causes the pre-existing project definition to be either stored or executed. It is thus respectfully submitted that the indicated portions of Dougherty do not teach the subject matter of the "transmitting" limitation which appears in Applicants' Claim 1. Consequently, even if Claim 1 of the '661 application is considered in view of the indicated portions of Dougherty, the result would not be the subject matter recited in Applicants' Claim 1.

A further consideration is that, in any obviousness analysis which involves a combination of teachings from two documents, the Examiner must not only propose how the teachings from the documents would be combined, but must also provide evidence that the prior art would motivate a person to make the proposed combination. (See MPEP §2143.01). In the present situation, the Examiner fails to do so. In particular, the Examiner merely makes the conclusory statement that "it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art to combine the recitation of the '661 application with the teaching of Dougherty thus enhancing the '661 application so the definition files might be loaded and executed remotely through a communications link". It is not clear that this sentence actually states a motivation for making the proposed combination, but even assuming that it does, the Office Action does not identify any specific portion of the prior art which is the origin for this motivation. Instead, the origin for motivation here is apparently a personal belief of the Examiner, rather than anything found in the prior art. Consequently, in the absence of a clear explanation from the Examiner as to why there would be motivation which originates in the prior art, the obviousness analysis is incomplete and therefore defective.

Applicants also wish to point out that an obviousness analysis in the context of a double patenting rejection is not the same as an obviousness analysis for purposes of 35 U.S.C. §103. As one aspect of this, the ultimate issue in a double patenting rejection is whether two claims are both directed to essentially the same subject matter. Although Claim 1 of the present application and Claim 1 of the '661 application each include some limitations that are similar, they also each include some other limitations that are radically different. For example, and as noted above, Claim 1 of the present application includes a recitation of "transmitting through a communications link from a first end thereof to a second end thereof a communication from a user which causes one of storing and execution of the project definition at said second end of the communication link". In contrast, Claim 1 of the '661 application recites: "wherein one of said function definitions identifies a separate application program, wherein one of said function portions which corresponds to said one function definition identifies a command for said application program, and wherein execution of said one function portion causes execution of said command by said application program in a manner which affects data present in said one function portion". When these radically different limitations are taken into account, it is respectfully submitted that Claim 1 of the present application and Claim 1 of the '661 application are not even remotely directed to the same basic subject matter, but instead are each directed to significantly different subject matter.

For the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully submitted that Claim 1 of the present application and Claim 1 of the '661 application are directed to respective different inventions, and that this remains true even if Claim 1 of the '661 application is considered in view of the Dougherty patent. It is therefore respectfully submitted that the double patenting rejection should be withdrawn with respect to Claim 1 of the present application.

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Turning to Claim 11 of the present application, the double patenting rejection is based on Claim 4 of the '661 application when considered in view of the Dougherty patent, based on essentially the same rationale discussed above in association with Applicants' Claim 1. Therefore, and for reasons similar to those discussed above in association with Applicants' Claim 1, it is respectfully submitted that Applicants' Claim 11 is directed to an invention which is different from the invention recited in Claim 4 of the '661 application, even when Claim 4 of the '661 application is considered in view of Dougherty. It is therefore respectfully submitted that the double patenting rejection of Applicants' Claim 11 should be withdrawn."

**Examiner's Response:**

The double patenting rejection is maintained because both applications read on each other and only one invention of the same type is allowed. Additionally, allowability is not an issue at this point, and the rejection involves two applications that are both still pending.

(B) "Independent Claim 1 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103 as obvious in view of a combination of teachings from Mukherjee U.S. Patent No. 6,226,322, Koppolu U.S. Patent No. 6,446,135 and the Dougherty patent. This ground of rejection is respectfully traversed, for the following reasons.

The primary reference in this rejection is the Mukherjee patent. Figure 1 of Mukherjee discloses hardware circuitry which includes three modems 8 and 15, the modem 8 being coupled to each of the modems 15 by a respective twisted wire pair (TWP). Generally speaking, the Examiner asserts that the modem circuitry shown in FIGURE 1 of Mukherjee corresponds to the "project definition" recited in Applicants' Claim 1, including a plurality of function portions, a further portion and binding information. However, Claim 1 specifies that a communication received through a communications link "causes one of storing and execution of the project definition" which is recited in Claim 1. The hardware circuitry shown in Figure 1 of Mukherjee is not capable of being "stored" or "executed", and thus is not even remotely comparable to the "project definition" which is recited in Applicants' Claim 1. Therefore, since the §103 rejection relies on Mukherjee for the disclosure of certain subject matter, and since Mukherjee does not actually disclose this subject matter, the §103 rejection necessarily fails, regardless of what is disclosed in Koppolu and Dougherty. Nevertheless, Koppolu and Dougherty will be briefly discussed for purposes of completeness.

The Office Action states that "Mukherjee does not teach identification of a separate application program and a command identified with one of the functions". The Office Action then goes on to assert that Koppolu does disclose this feature. Applicants respectfully submit that this is all irrelevant, because Claim 1 of the present application does not actually include a limitation directed to "a separate application program and a command identified with one of the functions". It is noted that the co-pending '661 application, which was discussed above in association with

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the double patenting rejection, includes independent claims with a limitation that refers to a separate application program and a command identified with one of the functions. But Claim 1 of the present application does not include any such limitation, and the indicated portion of Koppolu is thus believed to be entirely irrelevant to Claim 1 of the present application.

The Office Action goes on to assert that: "Neither Mukherjee nor Koppolu teaches the transmission of a project definition from one end of a communications link to another", and then asserts that Dougherty teaches this feature. Once again, however, the Examiner is discussing a feature which is not recited in Applicants' Claim 1. In particular, Applicants' Claim 1 never states that the recited project definition is necessarily transmitted through a communications link. Instead, Claim 1 recites that a communication is sent through a communications link, and causes one of storing or execution of a project definition. As discussed above in association with the double patenting rejection, the indicated portions of Dougherty do not disclose this feature. Consequently, this feature would not be obvious, even when the teachings of Dougherty are taken into account.

Still another consideration is that, as discussed earlier, a proper obviousness analysis under §103 must include not only a proposed combination of Mukherjee, Koppolu and Dougherty, but must also (1) establish motivation for making the proposed combination, and (2) establish that the motivation has its origin in the prior art. In the Office Action, the §103 rejection of Claim 1 merely offers a conclusory statement that a person of ordinary skill would make the proposed combination. The Office Action does not establish any solid motivation, much less that there is motivation which has its origins in the prior art.

For the reasons discussed above, it is respectfully submitted that there are a number of flaws in the §103 rejection of Claim 1, and that Claim 1 is not rendered obvious under §103 by Mukherjee, Koppolu and Dougherty. Claim 1 is therefore believed to be allowable, and notice to that effect is respectfully requested."

**Examiner's Response:**

The Applicant's argument is moot in view of the new grounds of rejection put forth in this action.

***Conclusion***

11. The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure:

U.S. Patent 6,557,164 to Faustini, regarding creating an object oriented component.

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12. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Lawrence Shrader whose telephone number is (703) 305-8046.

The examiner can normally be reached on M-F 08:00-16:30.

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Kakali Chaki can be reached on (703) 305-9662. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is (703) 872-9306.

Any inquiry of a general nature or relating to the status of this application or proceeding should be directed to the receptionist whose telephone number is (703) 305-3900.

Lawrence Shrader  
Examiner  
Art Unit 2124

September 15, 2003

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'John Chavis', with a stylized flourish at the end.

JOHN CHAVIS  
PATENT EXAMINER  
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